Alvin Kernan is not one to mince words. Four squadrons of American torpedo bombers went to battle at Midway on June 4, 1942.

The kindest word Kernan can use to describe this effort is “blunder.”

Kernan argues that three aspects of American weaponry contributed to the blunder: the Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter, the Douglas TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bomber, and the Mark 13 aerial torpedo.

The Wildcats were supposed to provide support for the torpedo squadrons during their attack, but they were hopelessly outclassed by their Japanese counterpart, the Zero. The Wildcat had a wide turning radius and was a slow climber. Most crucially, however, it had extremely limited range, while the Zero had fittings for an auxiliary tank that allowed one to fly nearly 2000 miles before running out of fuel. The Wildcat’s only advange was its armor, which was far superior to the Zero’s and allowed badly shot-up planes to return to base. At Midway, the Wildcats were unable to fight off the Zeros, which were able to attack the Devastators almost at will.

Even with adequate fighter support, however, the Devastators were unequal to the task of attacking the latest Japanese warships. In particular, they had extremely limited range. Aircraft carriers were forced to close within 150 miles of the enemy for the Devastators to have a reasonable chance of making it back aboard after their mission. The planes were also slow and sluggish, making them easy targets for Zeros.

The Mark 13 aerial torpedo was already ten years old by the early 1940s. They were heavy and slow. The Japanese ships against which they were launched at Midway were often able to outrun them. They often porpoised, forcing Devastator pilots to fly low and slow to get even a 50-50 chance of a successful launch. Even when the torpedo reached its target, it often failed to detonate. Compounding the problem was the lack of live-fire training for pilots. Over-confidence from the manufacturer robbed any urgency from the Navy brass. The Depression economy combined with the expense of each torpedo meant that training could be a budget buster.

There were also significant command errors during the course of the battle that contributed to the demise of the torpedo bomber squadrons. One squadron of Wildcats hung around at high altitude during an attack, doing nothing as Devastators were slaughtered near the surface. The fighters had arranged for a help signal from the bombers they were escorting, but they followed the wrong Devastators into battle. Never hearing the pre-arranged signal, they never engaged the enemy.

Another squadron of dive bombers covered by ten Wildcats flew off to the north of the Japanese fleet and never saw any action. This happened despite the advice of the wing’s torpedo bomber captain, who ended up veering off from his commander’ course. His squadron of Devastators met and launched an attack on the Japanese. Nearly all of them were killed during their approach.