In this collection of five previously published articles, Fallows effectively argues that the Bush Administration ignored the mountains of expert analysis that sought to predict problems that would be encountered in postwar Iraq.

Fallows documents dozens of efforts both inside and outside the government to analyze the probable flash points in Iraq after a successful American military invasion and present strategies for dealing with them. “Almost everything, good and bad, that has happened in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime was the subject of extensive prewar discussion and analysis.” Yet the administration consistently underestimated the number of troups necessary for maintaining postwar peace, failed to assign people of influence to detailed postwar planning, refused at the highest levels to acknowledge problems likely to occur during reconstruction, and only belatedly and half-heartedly engaged the problems once they were impossible to ignore.

The articles appear in close to their original form. Where necessary, Fallows has added hindsight-aided footnotes. His writing is forceful, well supported and argued, and simply too clear to ignore.